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Reflecting	on	Michael	McQuarrie’s	‘Revolt	of	the
Rust	belt’
Following	Donald	Trump’s	surprise	election	win	in	November	2016,	Michael	McQuarrie	of	LSE	Sociology	wrote
on	the	regional	nature	of	Trump’s	win.	His	blog	article,	“Trump	and	the	Revolt	of	the	Rust	Belt”,	has	now	formed
the	basis	of	a	new	article	in	the	British	Journal	of	Sociology.		We	asked	a	several	academic	experts	for	their
reactions	to	McQuarrie’s	new	article.	
McQuarrie	demonstrates	the	seriousness	of	the	region’s	economic	concerns	and	shows	that
Democrats	have	failed	to	offer	serious	solutions.	–	Ruth	Braunstein	–	University	of	Connecticut
By	linking	his	critique	to	place,	he	is	better	able	to	emphasize	how	institutions	that	normalize
expectation	around	political	participation	serve	a	vital	grassroots	role	–	Julian	C.	Chambliss	–
Rollins	College
Elections,	we	should	remind	ourselves,	are	fickle	things	that	defy	single	narratives	–	Joshua	D.
Ambrosius	and	Jennifer	Lumpkin	–	University	of	Dayton	
Michael	McQuarrie’s	response:	
All	social	science	relies	on	interpretation	and	judgements.	The	question	is	never	whether	or	not
such	things	are	happening,	but	whether	those	choices	are	reasonable	and	telling	us	something	we
didn’t	know.
McQuarrie	demonstrates	the	seriousness	of	the	region’s	economic	concerns
and	shows	that	Democrats	have	failed	to	offer	serious	solutions.	
Ruth	Braunstein	–	University	of	Connecticut
Within	a	week	of	the	2016	election,	Michael	McQuarrie	published	an	essay	–	on	this	site	–	arguing
that	Trump’s	victory	could	only	be	understood	by	taking	the	regional	nature	of	politics	into	account.	Trump	had
benefitted,	he	argued,	from	a	confluence	of	historical,	social	and	political	factors	that	together	produced	a	“revolt
of	the	Rust	Belt.”	In	his	more	fully	elaborated	version	of	this	argument	in	the	latest	issue	of	The	British	Journal	of
Sociology,	McQuarrie	does	not	dismiss	alternative	explanations	of	Trump’s	appeal:	white	nativism,	economic
concerns	of	working-class	voters,	or	the	low	turnout	of	black	voters.	He	rejects	explanations	that	single	one	factor
out	above	others,	and	insists	that	what	matters	is	how	these	factors	combined	in	a	particular	place	and	at	a
particular	time	to	shift	the	political	behavior	of	a	key	block	of	voters.	This	shift	was	the	crucial	thing.	Parts	of	what
McQuarrie	describes	are	also	happening,	to	varying	degrees,	beyond	the	Rust	Belt,	including	in	my	own	town	in	a
postindustrial	corner	of	Connecticut.	But	it	did	not	matter	that	my	town	turned	red	in	2016,	since	it	was	ensconced
within	a	still	reliably	blue	state.	It	did	matter	in	Michigan,	in	Ohio,	in	Wisconsin…
Among	the	many	striking	things	about	McQuarrie’s	argument	about	this	“revolt”	is	that	it	was	very	clearly	against
the	Democratic	Party	rather	than	for	anything	in	particular,	including	Trumpism.	McQuarrie	demonstrates	the
seriousness	of	the	region’s	economic	concerns	(it	has,	both	literally	and	figuratively,	been	“dismantled”),	and
shows	that	Democrats	have	failed	to	offer	serious	solutions.	Yet	it	is	difficult,	in	this	story,	to	disentangle	the
Democrats	from	the	Clintons,	and	the	Republicans	from	Trump.	Indeed,	these	are	two	of	the	many	reasons	the
2016	election	is	so	difficult	to	parse.	Hillary	was	not	merely	a	Democrat	(or	a	woman,	for	that	matter).	She	was
always	also	a	Clinton.	And	one	cannot	help	but	come	away	from	McQuarrie’s	article	without	sensing	the	profound
disappointment	that	Rust	Belt	voters	felt	toward	Bill	Clinton,	who	made	so	many	promises	and	kept	so	few.	In
another	world,	they	might	have	identified	with	Hillary,	who	had	also	weathered	her	husband’s	betrayals,	like	them,
through	faith	and	hard	work;	but	in	the	real	world,	she	was	Clinton	2.0.	Would	a	different	Democrat	have	met	her
same	fate?
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It	is	nearly	impossible	to	know,	and	either	way,	the	entire	Democratic	Party	now	represented	that	betrayal—of	the
Heartland	in	favor	of	the	coasts;	of	the	old	economy	in	favor	of	the	new.	In	a	two-party	system,	a	revolt	against
the	Democrats	leaves	voters	with	two	options:	stay	home	or	vote	for	the	other	guy.	McQuarrie	argues	that	black
voters	in	the	region	took	the	former	path,	while	white	voters	took	the	latter.	But	in	2016,	to	vote	Republican	was
also	to	vote	for	Donald	Trump—a	candidate	widely	viewed	as	unqualified,	even	within	his	own	party.	Which	leads
me	to	my	second	question:	Would	these	white	Rust	Belt	voters	have	cast	their	vote	for	just	any	Republican,	or
was	there	something	attractive	about	Trump?	McQuarrie	suggests	that	Trump’s	hostility	toward	the	“political
class”	along	with	his	break	from	the	“bipartisan	consensus”	on	free	trade	appealed	to	these	voters	in	a	way	that
mainstream	Republicans	may	not	have.	This	makes	sense,	but	also	prompts	us	to	look	upstream,	to	the	primary
election	in	which	voters	across	the	country	chose	Trump	over	more	qualified	Republican	candidates.
This	is	of	course	a	different	question	than	the	one	that	McQuarrie	seeks	to	answer,	but	his	rich	analysis	of	shifts
in	political	consciousness	within	the	Rust	Belt	nonetheless	helps	us	see	connections	between	this	region	and
other	parts	of	the	country.	Namely,	he	vividly	depicts	how	the	injury	of	economic	decline	was	exacerbated	by	the
insult	of	political	and	symbolic	marginalization.	Katherine	J.	Cramer	documents	similar	feelings	across	rural
Wisconsin.	Arlie	Hochschild,	too,	describes	resentment	among	Louisianans	whose	way	of	life	seemed	to	change,
as	if	overnight,	from	a	source	of	honor	to	a	source	of	dishonor,	especially	in	the	eyes	of	liberal	elites.	Similar
sentiments	were	on	display	within	the	northeastern	Tea	Party	group	I	studied	during	this	period,	positioning
participants	not	just	against	the	left,	but	also	against	the	political	establishment	of	both	parties.	Around	the
country,	some	of	these	voters	shifted	from	Democrat	to	Republican,	others	from	moderate	to	“Tea	Party”
Republican.	And	in	2016,	it	seems	clear	that	these	complex	feelings	of	devaluation	played	a	role	in	driving	voters
toward	Trump—in	both	the	primary	and	the	general	elections.
It	may	have	been	reasonable	for	Rust	Belt	voters	to	revolt	against	the	Democratic	Party;	and	perhaps	even	to
consider	supporting	a	Republican.	But	supporting	Trump	was	by	nearly	any	metric	an	irresponsible	gamble,	albeit
(like	most	of	the	vices	Trump	sells)	perhaps	a	pleasurable	one,	at	least	in	the	short	run—a	middle	finger	to	the
political	establishment,	the	political	(and	culturally	elitist)	left,	and	the	idea	of	political	community	in	general.	This
sentiment,	in	the	grey	area	between	“screw	you”	antagonism	and	“screw	it”	nihilism,	is	on	the	rise	–	within	the
Rust	Belt,	but	also	across	America’s	scarred	economic	landscape	–	and	it	is	among	the	most	alarming	artifacts	of
this	election.	Democrats	are	now	scrambling	to	appeal	to	struggling	regions	like	the	Rust	Belt,	as	they	should;	but
if	they	wish	to	truly	make	inroads,	they	must,	as	McQuarrie	does,	understand	that	voters’	economic	woes	cannot
be	disentangled	from	these	feelings	of	displacement	and	anomie.
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By	linking	his	critique	to	place,	he	is	better	able	to	emphasize	how	institutions
that	normalize	expectation	around	political	participation	serve	a	vital
grassroots	role.	
Julian	C.	Chambliss	–	Rollins	College
Michael	McQuarrie’s	searing	indictment	of	the	failure	of	the	Democratic	Party	highlights	the	complex	relationship
between	culture	and	property	at	the	core	of	the	U.S.	experience.	I	applaud	his	cogent	analysis;	the	problem	he
highlights	is	instructive	because	it	helps	us	to	define	how	the	reality	of	political	engagement	in	the	United	States
was	not	in	past	and	are	not	now	free	from	concerns	linked	to	identity.
By	arguing	Trump’s	2016	Midwest	victory	represents	a	failure	to	recognize	the	impact	of	place,	McQuarrie
resurrects	the	critique	found	in	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	New	Deal	Order,	1930-1980.		Then	Gary	Gerstle	and
Steve	Fraser	wrote,	“No	single	event	undermined	the	New	Deal	order;	no	particular	individual,	or	even	group	of
individuals,	dug	its	grave.”	Like	Gerstle	and	Fraser	McQuarrie	see	a	gap	between	what	was	promised	and	what
was	delivered	as	the	crucial	mistake.		The	goods	identified	by	Gerstle	and	Fraser:	citizenship	rights,	affluence,
individual	expressiveness,	and	stable	international	order	directed	by	the	United	States,	are	similar	to	those
McQuarrie	argue	have	slipped	from	the	reach	of	Midwestern	voters.
Yet,	by	linking	his	critique	to	place,	he	is	better	able	to	emphasize	how	institutions	that	normalize	expectation
around	political	participation	serve	a	vital	grassroots	role.	Like	Thomas	Sugrue’s	Origins	of	Urban	Crisis,	which
discussed	the	impact	of	deindustrialization	in	Detroit	to	J.	Mark	Souther’s	Believing	in	Cleveland,	which	highlights
the	failure	linked	to	“decline	and	renewal”	narratives	in	Cleveland,	we	see	how	organizations	rooted	in	the
community	can	either	bolster	or	hamper	action.	The	problem	we	should	consider	is	how	McQuarrie’s	analysis
calls	attention	to	the	tangible	benefits	linked	to	political	practice	in	the	United	States	have	been	grounded	in
notions	of	property	and	prosperity	constrained	by	identity.	It	is	no	revelation	that	region,	identity,	and	action
intersect	to	nurture	specific	policy.
Of	course,	the	past	saw	concerns	in	the	rural	hinterland	and	urban	area	more	easily	aligned.	Yet,	those
alignments	were	never	truly	equal.	The	industrial	economy	allowed	its	workers	access	to	levers	of	collective
power	often	denied	rural	agricultural	labor.	The	New	Deal	order	that	fostered	unions	left	out	black	agricultural
laborer	behind	because	FDR	needed	southern	support.	As	Steven	Conn	demonstrates,	other	New	Deal	policies
from	housing	to	road	construction	embellished	an	anti-urban	fear	of	“concentration”	associated	with	the	city.	In
this	past	context,	race	aligned	with	region	to	hamper	opportunity.	Now,	as	the	shift	to	an	information	economy	has
shifted	jobs	to	the	South	and	West,	those	same	dynamics	are	at	play.	How	we	understand	the	legacy	of	race	and
space	is	crucial	to	developing	the	path	toward	inclusive	policy.	This	reality	animates	new	research	into	fee
inequality	in	the	modern	economy	from	Devin	Fergus	and	frames	Carl	Nightingale’	cogent	analysis	of
segregation’s	global	impact.		Thus,	McQuarrie’s	analysis	should	be	seen	as	a	call	for	an	ideology	that	feeds	new
grassroots	institutions	that	wrestle	with	the	problem	of	labor	and	property	in	the	new	millennium.
Elections,	we	should	remind	ourselves,	are	fickle	things	that	defy
single	narratives	
Joshua	D.	Ambrosius	and	Jennifer	Lumpkin	–	University	of	Dayton	
Michael	McQuarrie’s	new	article	for	the	British	Journal	of	Sociology	argues	that	Donald
Trump’s	presidential	victory	was	less	about	his	voter	appeal	than	it	was	about	the	Democratic	Party’s	decades-
long	rebuffing	of	Rust	Belt	voters.		Black	and	poor	white	voters	turned	their	backs	on	Hillary	Clinton	with	double-
digit	declines	in	turnout	from	2012,	argues	McQuarrie.		In	their	progressive	march	toward	globalization,	the
Democratic	Party	left	the	Rust	Belt	behind—leaving	voters	to	either	stay	home	or	hitch	a	ride	with	the	only	other
ticket	to	the	White	House.
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On	a	whole,	the	paper	does	a	first-rate	job	describing	economic	and	political	shifts	in	the	upper	Midwest.		We
agree	with	many	of	the	claims	in	McQuarrie’s	analysis,	but	nonetheless	see	weaknesses	in	method,	tone,	and
novelty	that	undermine	his	case.
Methodologically,	McQuarrie’s	argument	is	mostly	sound	but	requires	more	support,	both	quantitative	and
geographical.		The	paper	explicitly	attempts	to	discredit	conventional	quantitative	analyses	based	in	exit	polling,
arguing	that	these	typical	descriptions	of	Trump’s	electoral	victory	fall	short	of	explanatory	power.		Simple
demographics,	the	paper	claims,	do	not	explain	the	Electoral	College	shift	that	broke	through	Hillary	Clinton’s	so-
called	“blue	wall”	in	the	northern	Midwest.		While	visualizing	the	shifts	in	percentage	support	for	Democratic
candidates	and	voter	turnout	supports	McQuarrie’s	thesis,	the	narrow	selection	of	counties	in	Figure	II	of	his
paper	does	little	to	show	where	and	to	what	extreme	the	Rust	Belt’s	hypothetical	revolt	took	place.		Eight	counties
appear	here	from	the	745	counties	contained	within	the	author’s	nine	Rust	Belt	states,	yet	only	Mahoning,	Ohio,
is	described	adequately	in	the	text.		A	better	approach	could	use	mapping	to	show	where	the	shifts	occurred	and
at	what	level	of	intensity.
“trump	sign	–	2016-11-08”	by	Tim	Evanson	is	licensed	under	CC	BY	SA	2.0
Furthermore,	is	McQuarrie’s	paper	a	meant	primarily	as	a	theoretical	tome	or	an	empirical	analysis?		The	paper
reads	more	as	the	former	despite	making	a	weighty	observation	about	the	reality	of	our	recent	election.		More
data	on	Rust	Belt	vote	switching	from	Obama	to	Trump	would	be	helpful.		McQuarrie	likely	pulled	sufficient	data
to	support	his	case,	but	showing	this	would	have	a	larger	impact	on	readers.		In	particular,	claims	about	lower
black	turnout	require	greater	evidence—if	not	exit	polling,	then	election	returns	from	majority	black	counties.		As	it
is,	the	paper	feels	less	like	an	empirical	argument	about	the	political	impacts	of	neoliberalism	than	it	does	a
theoretical	one.
The	paper	additionally	strikes	the	wrong	tone	by	making	grand	claims	about	the	“true”	story	of	the	election	that	go
quite	a	bit	beyond	the	data	presented.		Elections,	we	should	remind	ourselves,	are	fickle	things	that	defy	single
narratives.		McQuarrie’s	paper	mentions	other	claims	dealing	with	issues	like	race	but	then	subsumes	them	under
his	grand	narrative	of	regional	rebellion	rooted	in	economic	abandonment.		Along	these	same	lines,	he	illustrates
the	state	of	the	Rust	Belt	with	one	image	showing	a	dilapidated	home	—an	oversimplification	of	the	regional
housing	market	and	a	selection	on	par	with	darkly	motivated	disaster	tourism.
Finally,	the	argument	is	profound	but	not	exactly	novel.		We	ran	the	basic	claims	by	political	science	colleagues
and	they	agree	that	the	arguments	made	in	this	paper	are	more	common	knowledge	than	McQuarrie	claims.	
Maybe	it	strikes	a	UK	audience	as	unique,	but	here	in	the	Rust	Belt,	the	claims	are	generally	accepted.
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I	(Ambrosius)	previously	extended	my	work	on	election	outcomes	in	core,	urban	counties	to	the	2016	election.	
While	McQuarrie	looks	at	the	Rust	Belt	as	an	almost	uniform	swath	of	poor	white	folk	and	angry	black	people,	my
approach	treats	urban	and	rural	voters	as	separate	groups.		I	tend	to	attribute	Trump’s	wins	in	the	pivotal	Rust
Belt	states	to	the	GOP’s	ability	to	mobilize	the	disaffected	in	places	where	the	Democrats	forgot	to	campaign—
places	where	McQuarrie	rightly	sees	the	impacts	of	bipartisan	economic	policies.		Would	some	targeted
campaigning	by	Clinton	and	her	surrogates	have	overcome	Trump’s	extremely	narrow	victories	in	these	critical
states?		Maybe	(even	probably),	which	suggest	that	the	supposed	Rust	Belt	revolt	is	quite	a	bit	less	than	a	full-
fledged	revolution.
Differences	aside,	we	also	feel	the	devastation	of	a	Trump	presidency	and	believe	that	the	Democrats	must
differentiate	themselves	from	both	mainstream	Republican	and	Trumpian	economic	platforms	to	achieve	lasting
electoral	success—Rust	Belt	or	otherwise.
All	social	science	relies	on	interpretation	and	judgements.	The	question	is
never	whether	or	not	such	things	are	happening,	but	whether	those	choices	are
reasonable	and	telling	us	something	we	didn’t	know.
Michael	McQuarrie	–	LSE	Sociology
Let	me	start	by	thanking	Julian	Chambliss,	Ruth	Braunstein,	Joshua	Ambrosius,	and	Jennifer	Lumpkin	for	their
thoughtful	comments;	this	paper	would	have	probably	been	better	if	I	had	them	in	hand	earlier.	All	of	them	have
provocative	arguments	to	make	about	the	current	moment.	Some	of	my	favorites	from	these	scholars	include
Braunstein’s	analysis	of	religion	and	Americanism	in	the	2016	election,	Chambliss’s	piece	on	Mar-a-Lago	and
how	Trump’s	struggles	there	anticipated	his	political	career,	and	Ambrosius’s	piece	here	on	urban	support	for
Clinton.
Braunstein’s	response	asks	a	series	of	questions	that	are	rooted	in	her	own	familiarity	with	a	similar	set	of	voters,
stemming	from	her	recently	published	book	(you	can	hear	her	discussing	her	book	here).	She	agrees	that	the
devalorization	of	previously	privileged	people	is	becoming	a	pretty	broadly	accepted	consensus,	though	I	would
add	that	there	does	not	appear	to	be	much	depth	of	knowledge	behind	that	consensus	(what	has	been	“devalued”
and	why	is	it	important?).
Given	a	relatively	common	understanding	of	what	has	occurred	in	a	lot	of	Rust	Belt	territories,	Braunstein	asks
how	much	of	this	had	to	do	with	the	parties	and	how	much	with	the	candidates.	Another	candidate	might	not	have
lost	the	“Rust	Belt	Five”	in	this	election,	but	the	party	was	certainly	on	a	trajectory	to	lose	Rust	Belt	counties
eventually,	regardless	of	candidate	Clinton.	This	process	has	been	unfolding	for	a	while,	but	when	Gore	lost	West
Virginia	in	2000,	and	Democratic	candidates	kept	losing	the	state	by	ever-larger	margins	afterwards,	the	writing
was	on	the	wall	in	my	view.	The	party	hasn’t	been	a	party	of	the	working	class	for	a	long	time	now.
Some	people	will	argue	that	the	party’s	abandonment	of	the	poor,	working	class,	and	increasingly	the	middle
class	is	because	of	an	inherent	tension	between	identity	and	class	politics.	I	want	to	argue	it	is	far	more	about	the
party	itself,	how	it’s	organized,	and	the	institutions	that	connect	it	to	voters.	Interesting	new	work	by	Josh
Pacewicz,	Karen	Orren	and	Stephen	Skowronek,	and	Stephanie	Mudge	support	this.	The	party	is	premised	on
the	depoliticization	of	the	economy,	a	laissez-faire	attitude	to	new	economic	formations,	a	concern	for	minority
rights,	and	it	reflects	the	values	of	meritocratic	professionals.	Hillary	Clinton	is	the	sort	of	candidate	such	a	party
produces,	but	it	is	hardly	her	fault	that	it	does	so.	Of	course,	this	subsumes	the	potential	role	of	misogyny	in
determining	the	relevant	vote	swings	in	the	Midwest.	No	doubt,	there	is	no	shortage	of	this,	but	is	it	explanatory?
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I	think	there	is	quite	a	bit	of	research	that	supports	the	idea	that	Trump	exploited	divisions	that	had	been	present
for	some	time	and	that	the	Obama	presidency	wore	thin	on	Rust	Belt	counties	despite	a	lot	of	initial	enthusiasm.
Clinton	clearly	was	burdened	by	her	husband	in	all	kinds	of	ways,	and	it	is	useful	to	note	that	context	didn’t	favor
her	in	the	Rust	Belt.	In	the	mid-1990s,	right	after	Bill	Clinton	passed	NAFTA,	I	represented	the	union	I	worked	for
on	the	Central	Labor	Council	of	Dayton,	Ohio.	The	highlight	of	the	annual	picnic	was	the	destruction	of	a	brand-
new	Toyota	with	a	wrecking	ball.	People	don’t	forget	stuff	like	that,	and	Hillary	Clinton’s	continued	support	for
free-trade	treaties	didn’t	exactly	disassociate	her	from	her	husband.	Nonetheless,	it	is	important	to	remember	that
a	lot	has	changed.	Hillary	Clinton	did	far	better	than	her	husband	in	terms	of	the	national	vote.	Indeed,	even
though	I	was	writing	before	the	election	about	Trump’s	support	in	the	Rust	Belt,	I	fully	expected	him	to	lose
anyway.	The	party	is	perfectly	capable	of	getting	votes,	but	it	is	not	well-designed	to	get	Rust	Belt	votes	no	matter
who	the	candidate	is.	Federalism	is	annoying	when	you’re	in	the	majority.
If	this	is	accurate,	then	the	question	of	“irresponsibility”	that	Braunstein	raises	shifts	a	bit.	Sure,	it’s	annoying	that
Rust	Belt	voters	voted	nihilistically.	On	the	other	hand,	they	aren’t	really	in	charge	of	the	party,	the	people	it
courts,	or	the	policies	it	enacts.	They	are	not,	after	all,	the	political	professionals.	Voting	for	Trump	is	irresponsible
and	unlikely	to	pay	off	for	Rust	Belt	voters,	but	like	racism,	there’s	plenty	of	irresponsibility	to	go	around	and	Rust
Belt	voters	hold	no	monopoly	on	either.	Expecting	people	who	are	struggling	to	hold	their	communities	together	to
keep	in	mind	their	responsibility	to	the	rest	of	us	isn’t	unreasonable,	but	since	we	haven’t	demonstrated	any
sense	of	responsibility	to	them	the	expectation	strikes	me	as	tacky.
On	the	question	of	how	the	party	is	connected	to	voters,	Chambliss	takes	up	this	issue	in	a	provocative	way	that	I
attempted	to	take	seriously	in	the	paper,	but	probably	not	seriously	enough.	Chambliss	says	that	political
practices	are	“grounded	in	notions	of	property	and	prosperity	constrained	by	identity.”	Chambliss	notes	that	the
institutional	articulation	of	the	politics	of	the	New	Deal	was	premised	on	the	exclusion	of	agricultural	labor	(mostly
black	and	Latinx),	and,	I	would	add,	various	kinds	of	“voluntary”	and	domestic	labor	(mostly	women).	My	usual
response	to	this	kind	of	argument	is	simply	to	note	that	uneven	development	is	real	and	the	description	of	“urban
vortexes”	in	the	paper	was	meant	to	illustrate	some	of	those	dynamics	without	relying	on	the	dry	language	of
capital	flows.
But	that	is	probably	not	up	to	the	task	of	dealing	with	Chambliss’s	point.	Uneven	development	always	privileges
and	marginalizes,	but	race,	I	think	Chambliss	is	saying,	is	more	than	merely	a	dimension	of	these	processes.	It	is
constitutive.	Our	capitalism	doesn’t	have	a	racial	dimension	to	it,	it	is	racial	capitalism.	The	paper	makes	a
concerted	effort	to	illustrate	the	ways	in	which	the	regional	privilege	of	the	Rust	Belt	was	racialized,	but	in	treating
race	as	a	dimension	of	these	dynamics,	rather	than	constitutive	of	them,	it	might	be	missing	the	point.
Both	Chambliss	and	Ambrosius	and	Lumpkin	give	a	version	of	the	idea	that	emphasizing	place	and	its	role	in
politics	is	somewhat	banal.	It	is	certainly	true	that	when	one	says	it,	people	don’t	reject	it	as	crazy.	And	while
historians	like	Chambliss	are	certainly	well	aware	of	the	heavily	regional	nature	in	American	political	history
(Chambliss	gives	the	example	of	the	Wagner	Act	in	his	comment),	it	is	nonetheless	also	the	case	that	most	of	our
tools	of	election	analysis	obliterate	place	and	its	specificity.	There	is	a	related	question	about	institutions	and
political	articulation.	Far	too	much	political	analysis	is	unable	to	operationalize	the	role	of	institutions,	much	less
the	role	of	place.	The	theories	of	action	that	lie	behind	what	I	call	“actuarial”	modes	of	analysis	are	usually
simplistically	mechanistic	and	they	are	premised	on	“de-placing”	individuals.	Chambliss	says	that	historians	know
this	already,	which	I	believe,	but	Ambrosius	and	Lumpkin	want	to	say	political	scientists	do	too.	Well,	if	that’s	true
they	sure	haven’t	figured	out	how	to	deploy	these	in	their	analyses	very	consistently	or	effectively.	Looking	at
collections	and	journal	special	issues	on	the	election	I	find	hardly	any	papers	or	essays	are	attentive	to	place.
Somehow,	all	this	“place-consciousness”	isn’t	organizing	much	analysis.	The	point	isn’t	that	place	is	somehow	a
discovery,	the	paper	cites	lots	of	people	who	mobilize	place	for	analytical	purposes,	it	is	that	we	don’t	incorporate
it	very	well	into	the	social	science	of	politics.
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Ambrosius	and	Lumpkin	accuse	me	of	articulating	a	“grand	narrative”	that	does	violence	to	the	messiness	of
empirical	detail.	This	despite	the	fact	that	I	say	specifically	that	place	reasserted	itself	in	this	election.	By	“grand
narrative”	Ambrosius	and	Lumpkin	actually	mean	“a	narrative”.	This	is	sort	of	what	historical	explanation	does,
postmodernism	aside.	The	long	and	short	of	this:	I	doubt	Hegel	would	have	me	in	his	“grand	narratives”	club.	But
what	about	the	obliteration	of	all	those	pesky	details?	Ambrosius	and	Lumpkin	take	issue	with	my	presentation	of
the	foreclosure	crisis	and	its	aftermath,	to	take	up	one	issue	in	particular.	Pictures	and	figures	are,	Ambrosius	and
Lumpkin	tell	me,	supposed	to	be	“representative”	of	some	truth	and	mine	aren’t.	They	find	a	picture	of	a	house
with	its	siding	stripped	off	to	be	misleading	and	suggest	it	is	manipulative.	The	house,	I’m	told,	is	not
representative	of	real-estate	values	generally.	But	just	because	the	extreme	cases	are	extreme	doesn’t	make
them	any	less	instructive.	Just	because	some	communities	managed	to	keep	the	siding	on	their	houses	is	utterly
irrelevant	when	they	have	lost	60	percent	of	their	value.	In	this	context	cities	go	bankrupt	and	schools	are
defunded,	siding	present	or	not.	And	the	house	is	still	pretty	representative,	at	least	representative	enough	that
the	city	of	Cleveland	spent	nearly	its	entire	share	stimulus	funding	on	housing	demolitions	and	still	couldn’t	keep
up	with	the	problem.	And	never	mind	that	metal	scrapping	became	a	full-scale	industry	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis.	I
didn’t	get	a	Ph.D	in	order	to	translate	Gaussian	distributions	into	English	(I	explain	my	reasoning	on	foreclosure	in
more	detail	here	and	the	context	for	the	Rust	Belt	Revolt	argument	here).
All	social	science	relies	on	interpretation	and	judgements.	The	question	is	never	whether	or	not	such	things	are
happening,	but	whether	those	choices	are	reasonable	and	telling	us	something	we	didn’t	know.	The	choices	I
made	in	the	paper	are	in	the	service	of	a	broader	argument	that	needed	to	be	made.	It	is	too	bad	that	Ambrosius
and	Lumpkin	are	not	that	interested	in	it.	Writing	from	Ohio,	they	probably	know	too	much	already.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.											
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